| Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory by David Krieger February 07, 2011 |
Nuclear deterrence is the threat of nuclear retaliation for a proscribed behavior, generally an attack upon the threatening state. The theory of nuclear deterrence posits that such threat, if perceived as real and likely to cause sufficient devastation, will prevent an attack or other proscribed behavior from occurring. The desire for a nuclear deterrent existed even before nuclear weapons were created. Refugee scientists from Europe, concerned about the possible development of German nuclear weapons during World War II, encouraged the United States to explore the use of uranium for building nuclear weapons. Albert Einstein was among the scientists who urged President Roosevelt to initiate a program to explore the feasibility of creating such weapons as a deterrent to the use of a German nuclear weapon, should the Germans succeed in their quest. After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he would consider this to be one of the great mistakes of his life.
By the time the United States succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in July 1945, Germany was already defeated. The US used its powerful new bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In doing so, it sent a nuclear deterrent message to other states, particularly the Soviet Union, that the US possessed nuclear weapons and was willing to use them. This would spur on the secret Soviet nuclear weapons program to deter future use of the US nuclear arsenal. Other states would follow suit. Britain and France developed nuclear arsenals to deter the Soviets. China developed nuclear arms to deter the US and the Soviets. Israel did so to assure its independence and deter potential interventions from the other nuclear weapon states. India developed nuclear weapons to deter China and Pakistan, and Pakistan to deter India. North Korea did so to deter the US.
One steady factor in the Nuclear Age has been the adherence of the nuclear weapon states to the theory of nuclear deterrence. Each country that has developed nuclear weapons has justified doing so by the pursuit of nuclear deterrence. The security of not only the nuclear weapon states but of civilization has rested upon the reliability of the theory of nuclear deterrence. Vast numbers of people throughout the world believe that nuclear deterrence contributes to the security of the planet and perhaps to their personal security and that of their family. But does it? What if nuclear deterrence is a badly flawed theory? What if nuclear deterrence fails? What if political and military leaders in all nuclear weapon states who have treated nuclear deterrence theory as sacrosanct and imbued it with godlike, but unrealistic, powers of protection are wrong? The future itself would stand in grave danger, for the failure of nuclear deterrence could pose an existential threat to humanity.
As a former commander of the US Strategic Command, General George Lee Butler was in charge of all US nuclear weapons. After retiring from the US Air Force, General Butler critiqued nuclear deterrence, stating that it “suspended rational thinking in the Nuclear Age about the ultimate aim of national security: to ensure the survival of the nation.” He concluded that nuclear deterrence is “a slippery intellectual construct that translates very poorly into the real world of spontaneous crises, inexplicable motivations, incomplete intelligence and fragile human relationships.”
As volcanoes often give off strong warning signals that they may erupt, so we have witnessed such signals regarding nuclear arsenals and the failure of nuclear deterrence theory over the course of the Nuclear Age. Nuclear arsenals could erupt with volcano-like force, totally overwhelming the relatively flimsy veneer of “protection” provided by nuclear deterrence theory. In the face of such dangers, we must not be complacent. Nor should we continue to be soothed by the “experts” who assure us not to worry because the weapons will keep us safe. There is, in fact, much to worry about, much more than the nuclear policy makers and theorists in each of the nuclear weapon states have led us to believe. I will examine below what I believe are ten serious flaws in nuclear deterrence theory, flaws that lead to the conclusion that the theory is unstable, unreliable and invalid.
1. It is only a theory. It is not proven and cannot be proven. A theory may posit a causal relationship, for example, if one party does something, certain results will follow. In the case of nuclear deterrence theory, it is posited that if one party threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the other side will not attack. That an attack has not occurred, however, does not prove that it was prevented by nuclear deterrence. That is, in logic, a false assumption of causality. In logic, one cannot prove a negative, that is, that doing something causes something else not to happen. That a nuclear attack has not happened may be a result of any number of other factors, or simply of exceptional good fortune. To attribute the absence of nuclear war to nuclear deterrence is to register a false positive, which imbues nuclear deterrence with a false sense of efficacy.
2. It requires a commitment to mass murder. Nuclear deterrence leads to policy debates about how many threatened deaths with nuclear weapons are enough to deter an adversary? Are one million deaths sufficient to deter adversary A? Is it a different number for adversary B? How many deaths are sufficient? One million? Ten million? One hundred million? More? There will always be a tendency to err on the side of more deaths, and thus the creation of more elaborate nuclear killing systems. Such calculations, in turn, drive arms races, requiring huge allocations of resources to weapons systems that must never be used. Leaders must convince their own populations that the threat of mass murder and the expenditure of resources to support this threat make them secure and is preferable to other allocations of scientific and financial resources. The result is not only a misallocation of resources, but also a diversion of effort away from cooperative solutions to global problems.
3. It requires effective communications. In effect, nuclear deterrence is a communications theory. Side A must communicate its capability and willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in retaliation for an attack by adversary B, thereby preventing adversary B from attacking. The threat to retaliate and commit mass murder must be believable to a potential attacker. Communications take place verbally in speeches by leaders and parliamentary statements, as well as news reports and even by rumors. Communications also take place non-verbally in the form of alliance formations and nuclear weapons and missile tests. In relation to nuclear deterrence, virtually everything that each side does is a deliberate or inadvertent form of communication to a potential adversary. There is much room for error and misunderstanding.
4. It requires rational decision makers. Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against a decision maker who is irrational. For example, side A may threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack by adversary B, but the leader of side B may irrationally conclude that the leader of side A will not do what he says. Or, the leader of side B may irrationally attack side A because he does not care if one million or ten million of his countrymen die as a result of side A’s nuclear retaliation. I believe two very important questions to consider are these: Do all leaders of all states behave rationally at all times, particularly under conditions of extreme stress when tensions are very high? Can we be assured that all leaders of all states will behave rationally at all times in the future? Most people believe the answer to these questions is an unqualified No.
5. It instills a false sense of confidence. Nuclear deterrence is frequently confused with nuclear “defense,” leading to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide some form of physical protection against attack. This conclusion is simply wrong. The weapons and the threat of their use provide no physical protection. The only protection provided is psychological and once the weapons start flying it will become clear that psychological protection is not physical protection. One can believe the weapons make him safer, but this is not the same as actually being safer. Because nuclear deterrence theory provides a false sense of confidence, it could lead a possessor of the weapons to take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats in place. Such risks could be counterproductive and actually lead to nuclear war.
6. It does not work against an accidental use. Nuclear deterrence is useful, if at all, only against the possibility of an intentional, premeditated nuclear attack. Its purpose is to make the leader who contemplates the intentional use of a nuclear weapon decide against doing so. But nuclear deterrence cannot prevent an accidental use of a nuclear weapon, such as an accidental launch. This point was made in the movie Dr. Strangelove, in which a US nuclear attack was accidentally set in motion against the Soviet Union. In the movie, bomber crews passed their “failsafe” point in a training exercise and couldn’t be recalled. The president of the United States had to get on the phone with his Soviet counterpart and try to explain that the attack on Moscow that had been set in motion was just an accident. The Americans were helpless to stop the accident from occurring, and so were the Soviets. Accidents happen! There is no such thing as a “foolproof” system, and when nuclear weapons are involved it is extremely dangerous to think there is.
7. It doesn’t work against terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. Since it is not possible to retaliate against a foe that you cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances. Further, terrorists are often suicidal (e.g., “suicide bombers”), and are willing to die to inflict death and suffering on an adversary. For these reasons, nuclear deterrence will be ineffective in preventing nuclear terrorism. The only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to prevent the weapons themselves from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This will become increasingly difficult if nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials to build them proliferate to more and more countries.
8. It encourages nuclear proliferation. To the extent that the theory of nuclear deterrence is accepted as valid and its flaws overlooked or ignored, it will make nuclear weapons seem to be valuable instruments for the protection of a country. Thus, the uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence theory provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation. If it is believed that nuclear weapons can keep a country safe, there will be commensurate pressure to develop such weapons.
9. It is not believable. In the final analysis, it is likely that even the policy makers who promote nuclear deterrence do not truly believe in it. If policy makers did truly believe that nuclear deterrence works as they claim, they would not need to develop missile defenses. The United States alone has spent over $100 billion on developing missile defenses over the past three decades, and is continuing to spend some $10 billion annually on missile defense systems. Such attempts at physical protection against nuclear attacks are unlikely to ever be fully successful, but they demonstrate the underlying understanding of policy makers that nuclear deterrence alone is insufficient to provide protection to a country. If policy makers understand that nuclear deterrence is far from foolproof, then who is being fooled by nuclear deterrence theory? In all likelihood, the only people being fooled by the promised effectiveness of nuclear deterrence theory are the ordinary people who place their faith in their leaders, the same people who are the targets of nuclear weapons and will suffer the consequences should nuclear deterrence fail. Their political and military leaders have made them the “fools” in what is far from a “foolproof” system.
10. Its failure would be catastrophic. Nuclear deterrence theory requires the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the threat of retaliation. These weapons can, of course, be used for initiating attacks as well as for seeking to prevent attacks by means of threatened retaliation. Should deterrence theory fail, such failure could result in consequences beyond our greatest fears. For example, scientists have found in simulations of the use of 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons in an exchange between India and Pakistan, the deaths could reach one billion individuals due to blast, fire, radiation, climate change, crop failures and resulting starvation. A larger nuclear war between the US and Russia could destroy civilization as we know it.
The flaws in nuclear deterrence theory that I have discussed cannot be waved aside. They show that the theory has inherent weaknesses that cannot be overcome. Over time, the theory will suffer more and more stress fractures and, like a poorly constructed bridge, it will fail. Rather than staying docilely on the sidelines, citizens of the nuclear weapon states must enter the arena of debate. In fact, they must create the debate by challenging the efficacy and validity of nuclear deterrence theory.
After these many years of accepting nuclear deterrence theory as valid and unimpeachable, it is time to awaken to the reality that it could fail and fail catastrophically. The answer to the risks posed by nuclear deterrence theory is not to shore up an inherently flawed theory, but to take a new path, a path leading to the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the planet. This is not an impossible dream and, in fact, the risks of taking this path are far less than maintaining nuclear arsenals justified by an unstable and unproven theory. But for this dream to be realized, citizens will have to raise their voices, challenge their leaders, and refuse to be docile in the face of the overwhelming threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity.
David Krieger is President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
ARTICLE -2-
- Because nuclear weapons continue to exist, there is the permanent danger of catastrophe, and the system might produce catastrophe rather than stalemate.
- The system requires that nuclear powers regard each other as possible enemies, keeping calculating military balances against each other, and watching nervously for signs that others have found ways to break the stalemate in their favor and engage in nuclear blackmail, or even an attack.
- While, theorectically, deterrence could be maintained by only a few nuclear weapons, the kind of suspicion and uncertainty that exists tends to drive nuclear powers to heavy expenditures in order to increase or improve their arsenals. This, in turn, reinforces mutual suspicion.
- As such suspicions illustrate, simple nuclear deterrence is based on the assumption that there is no adequate defense yet. In recent years, however, this assumption has been undermined in two ways:
- First, ways of intercepting bombers and missiles have been much improved. Although any adequate defense against a large-scale nuclear attack in the near future seems unlikely, would-be deterers have to worry about possible defense against their retaliation. This, however, can increase suspicion and competition.
- Secondly, missiles have become more accurate. While early intercontinental missiles typically missed targets by a mile or two, they can now achieve accuracies of a few hundred feet and will soon be able to arrive within a few yards. Therefore, it might be possible to seek defense by destroying an enemy's retaliatory force before it could be used. The possibility of such a counterforce strike against enemy forces rather than against cities or industry could be combined with active defenses against the weakened surviving retaliatory force.
- safety devices to prevent accidental explosions or launching of weapons
- laws and military discipline for making sure that people obey orders
- devices to prevent people from acting without authority
Nuclear Warfare
An Overview of the History
- The discovery that it is possible to release the energy within the atomic structure of certain elements has led to the manufacture of weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. Such weapons present a great danger as they are capable of causing damage on an immense scale and possibly killing hundreds of millions of people while destroying the basis of civilized life over wide areas. In the 19th century, the rapid advance of modern technology and industrial organization greatly increased both the destructive power of armed forces and the capacity of societies both to resist and to recover from an attack. In the present century, these advances have already resulted in two massively destructive world wars. These experiences led many to question whether modern war on a large scale remained a practical--let alone a morally justifiable--way to achieve political purposes. Nuclear weapons carry the possibilities of destruction to a new level for
- This not only makes the consequences of war worse but also raises new concerns about controlling such a destructive process. Fearing the consequences of losing control, the nations possessing nuclear weapons, have, therefore, become extremely cautious in managing these dangers and in their dealing with each other. A more in depth view of the history of nuclear warfare is on the nuclear past page.
Countermeasures
Nuclear Deterrence
Over the past few decades, ways of living with nuclear weapons have evolved, creating political systems that everyone hopes will prevent such weapons from ever being used. The main feature of these systems is known as nuclear deterrence. Quite soon after the destructive power of nuclear weapons was realized, people understood that an active defense, such as shooting down bombers, was impossible. But a passive defense (building air raid shelters, evacuating peple, etc.) would not do much good either. Safety could only come from persuading potential attackers not to attack at all. This could best be done by convincing them that they would suffer an equally bad attack in return. This threat of retaliation, therefore, would perhaps serve to deter the possible aggressor. While deterrence is not a new idea, what is new about nuclear deterrence is, first, that it may be the only defense possible and, secondly, that a well-designed nuclear force could create retaliatory threats so great that no leader would ever act to bring about such destruction deliberately. Consequently, whatever its other military policies, each of the nuclear powers has tried to develop a nuclear retaliatory force that could--even if its enemies struck first--deliver in a second strike a blow that would result in unacceptable damage to the aggressor. That is the principle behind nuclear deterrence. It can be argued that nuclear deterrence is effective because no nuclear weapons have been used in warfare ever since 1945, but a world of nuclear deterrence has several obvious drawbacks:Ways to Control Nuclear Forces
Early-warning Systems
The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and the danger of escalation to higher levels of warfare if even one or two were used, makes governments possessing nuclear weapons anxious to guarantee their use only when absolutely necessary. Consequently, great care has been taken to perfect the systems that control nuclear weapons, and systems for Command, Control, and Communication, or C3. Closely connected to this system for controlling forces are the systems used to determine the size and capabilities of potentially hostile forces and to provide warning of an impending attack. Most of these activites are now performed by the many kinds of sensors carried by space satellites and by ground-based radars such as the three U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Systems (BMEWS) that are located in Alaska, Greenland, and England. The systems for preventing unintended use of nuclear weapons can be divided into three categories:Surveillance Satellites
Satellites provide their owners with much information about the activities of other countries and also provide useful reassurance that nothing too dangerous is happening or that an atttack is not imminent. If nuclear war were tragically to occur, satellites could help to control it by providing reliable information about what was actually happening and therefore, could reduce the typical confusion that is often referred to as the "fog of war."Antimissile Weapons
It takes only a very few of the larger nuclear weapons to create great destruction. Power nuclear warheads are now only a few feet in length so they can be delivered by ballistic missiles, which cannot be stopped by traditional air defenses. For many years, it was thought that no defense was possible against ballistic missiles, but now the situation has changed. This is an important development because the revolution created by nuclear weapons would be significantly reversed if effective defenses against missiles were to be developed. In the past, developments in rocketry and in electronic guidance made it possible for one rocket to intercept another and destroy it. But while it was possible to intercept single test rockets, catching all of a numerous incoming attack still seemed impossible. As it only took a few penetrations to cause a disaster, U.S. experts did not think building a defensive network was worth the great expense. A further reason to be doubtful about ballistic missile defenses then was the probable ease with which an attacker could make the defender's job more difficult. Although the most expensive, the simplest way would be to buy more offensive missiles to "saturate" the defense. Cheaper ways would be to equip reentry vehicles with devices such as chaff and decoys--lightweight imitations that acted like the real thing while outside the atmosphere--to confuse the defensive radar. There are also broader arguments against ballistic missile defenses, and one is that such defenses could accelerate an arms race such as the Cold War mentioned in the nuclear past section. Many people believe that if all parties in a nuclear balance of power know they have no defense, they will be cautious and content with fairly small attacking forces. But if an attacker faced with defenses, tries to get through by increasing the size of its attack, the result might be more rather than less destruction if the defenses failed. On the other hand, if one side were confident in its defense, it might be more tempted to use its own offensive forces. It was this kind of thinking that led to the U.S. and the Soviet Union signing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972. That treaty limited each side to one defended area. The Soviet Union has one around Moscow, but the United States has yet to build the system permitted by the treaty.Star Wars
Although the challenge of intercepting a reentry vehicle was technologically mastered in the 1960s, it still seemed impossible to offer a really worthwhile defense to a full-scale sttack. By the 1980s, however, a variety of technological advances had made such a defense seem possible. Because space operations played such an important role in these efforts, the U.S. program, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), became known as Star Wars. Many differeny technologies contributed to this new optimism. Radars had become more efficient, and computers were much more capable of rapidly processing the information they received. Interceptor rockets could more quickly meet attacking warheads and, where earlier systems had to rely on nuclear explosions to destroy hostile reentry vechiles, more accurate interception made it possible to employ non-nuclear kill methods such as conventional explosions and shrapnel-like clusters of solid projectiles, or kinetic kill. the most Star Wars-like idea was to use laser beams from the ground or from satellites to damage offensive vehicles. As rockets rose slowly and vulnerably from the ground with all their later-to-be-dispersed multiple warheads aboard, they might be destroyed by kinetic or laser deviecs in satillites over enemy launch-sites. These ideas offered the possibility of a layered defense, whereby the offensive force would be attacked during all three stages of its flight: the boost phase, the mid-course phase, and the reentry, or terminal, phase. Thus, the defense would have several chances to attack and could enjoy a good overall performance, even if each phase had been only partially successful. There are still many difficulties with a layered defense, however, and many of the necessary devices are still in the experimental stage. It is particularly difficult to get the necessary energy for lasers into space because the atmosphere has the effect of shielding the ground. Moreover, the attacker can use countermeasures such as decoys and can "harden," or strengthen, its weapons against lasers. It can also increase the acceleration of its boosters to permit the separation of the warheads while they are still within the atmosphere, which will give them some shielding from lasers. They enemy can, of course, also nicrease the attack by aircraft or cruise missiles, which means the defender must also have a good antiaircraft system. Once an option becomes technologically possible, its usefulness always depends on the cost. for instance, can an attacker afford to maintain the effectiveness of its attack? Most experts belive it will be a long time, if ever, before a "leak-proof umbrella of defense" can be built. But before then, defenses may become efficient enough to reduce an attacker's confidence in success and thus promote deterrence.Nuclear Terrorism--something bad to consider
- So far in this nuclear age, nuclear weapons have been in the possession of only very few nations. While the danger of an increasing number of countries gaining possessiong of these powerful new weapons has long been recognized, much less attention has been given to the possibility that private groups might gain access to a nuclear weapon. In an age of widespread terrorism, it is not difficult to imagine the attraction that such a terrifying instrument might have for those seeking power for coercion or blackmail. In theory, terrorists might either seize an existing weapon or set up a secret organization to make one. On the whole, obtaining nuclear weapons by unauthorized individuals or groups seems unlikely because nuclear materials are difficult to acquire and to handle. Military weapons and nuclear power stations and manufacturing facilities are closely guarded, often by special police forces or by technological devices. Also, nuclear weapons often contain mechanism that not only prevent accidental explosions but also disable the weapon if an unauthorized person tampers with it. Radioactive material is so dangerous, however, that it might not be necessary for terrorists to obtain a weapon. Instead, they could create immense fear and panic if they were only suspected of possessing a nuclear bomb and threatened to release radioactive material. As the amount of radioactive waste in the world increases, this might offer one of the easier methods for terrorists.
Aftermath of Nuclear War
- The detonation of nuclear weapons has a number of very powerful effects. Chief among them are the immediate release of X-ray energy followed by thermal radiation, atmospheric blast and the subsequent movement of longer-term radiation, which is carried in dust from the bomb and residue from any crater. These longer term aftereffects depend on the design of the weapon and how it was used--whether on the earth's surface or below the ground or in or above the atmosphere. The weather is also a factor. Wind can cause long-distance travel of particles, and fog can shield against thermal radiation. The explosive nuclear components of a typical weapon instantly rise to temperatures of several million degrees and create a massive fireball of heat and radiation, usually culminating in fallout. An explosion in the atmostphere also causes a shock wave of compressed air that travels at about one-half mile in two seconds. This causes over-pressure. Here the first wave meets a reactive reflection. Thermal radiation also occurs, and animals up to some 12 miles from where the bomb detonated can be burned. Buildings will suffer damage chiefly from explosion and fire. Buildings are also destroyed by fires caused by the thermal radiation. Although people are usually injured by the collapse of buildings rather than by the over-pressure, the various forms of radiation also kill people, either quickly or slowly. Of course, there are also many medical effects on humans from radiation. For more information on that, consult the radiation effects on humans page.
The Future
- There are many arguments both for and against abolition, disarmament, and arms control. Everyone has his or her own idea about how best to tackle the intensely serious problem of nuclear weapons. Some will work for their abolition, which is the declared ultimate goal of most world leaders. The difficulties of achieving this are very great, however, and careless or overeager efforts to achieve this goal might actually be harmful. While nuclear weapons are a great danger, they exist because the nations that own them think they provide some protection against serious threats to their security, some of which are also nuclear. Most statesmen, therefore, believe that the day for abolishing nuclear weapons is far off and, meanwhile, nations must find safe ways to live with them. In effect, this is an arms control outlook that can be pursued both by trying to have cautious strategies and controllable weapons, safe from accidents, and by agreements about arms control. Under such an arrangement, governments would undertake to reduce the number of weapons and abolish dangerous ones and keep each other informed and reassured about situations that might otherwise cause countries to take hostile action. While no single action will guarantee success, everyone seems to realize that failure would be catastrophic for everyone--everywhere--on this earth.
ARTICLE -3-
Think Again: Nuclear Weapons
President Obama’s pledge to rid the world of atomic bombs is a waste of breath. But not for the reasons you might imagine.
BY JOHN MUELLER | JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010
""Nuclear Weapons Are the Greatest Threat to Humankind."
No. But you might think so if you listen to world leaders right now. In his first address to the U.N. Security Council, U.S. President Barack Obama warned apocalyptically, "Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city -- be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris -- could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And it would badly destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life." Obama has put nuclear disarmament back on the table in a way it hasn't been for decades by vowing to pursue a nuclear-free world, and, with a handful of big treaty negotiations in the works, he seems to think 2010 has become a critical year
But the conversation is based on false assumptions. Nuclear weapons certainly are the most destructive devices ever made, as Obama often reminds us, and everyone from peaceniks to neocons seems to agree. But for more than 60 years now all they've done is gather dust while propagandists and alarmists exaggerate their likelihood of exploding -- it was a certainty one would go off in 10 years, C.P. Snow authoritatively proclaimed in 1960 -- and nuclear metaphysicians spin fancy theories about how they might be deployed and targeted.
Nuclear weapons have had a tremendous influence on the world's agonies and obsessions, inspiring desperate rhetoric, extravagant theorizing, and frenetic diplomatic posturing. However, they have had very limited actual impact, at least since World War II. Even the most ingenious military thinkers have had difficulty coming up with realistic ways nukes could conceivably be applied on the battlefield; moral considerations aside, it is rare to find a target that can't be struck just as well by conventional weapons. Indeed, their chief "use" was to deter the Soviet Union from instituting Hitler-style military aggression, a chimera considering that historical evidence shows the Soviets never had genuine interest in doing anything of the sort. In other words, there was nothing to deter.
Instead, nukes have done nothing in particular, and have done that very well. They have, however, succeeded in being a colossal waste of money -- an authoritative 1998 Brookings Institution study showed the United States had spent $5.5 trillion on nukes since 1940, more than on any program other than Social Security. The expense was even more ludicrous in the cash-starved Soviet Union.
And that does not include the substantial loss entailed in requiring legions of talented nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians to devote their careers to developing and servicing weapons that have proved to have been significantly unnecessary and essentially irrelevant. In fact, the only useful part of the expenditure has been on devices, protocols, and policies to keep the bombs from going off, expenditures that would, of course, not be necessary if they didn't exist.
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